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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AVOIDING DISASTER VS. ANSWERING DISASTER
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, airborne
travelers might have suggested what they wanted most out of
their chosen airline was more leg room, better in-flight movies,
additional cocktails, or saltier peanuts. But after our nation
viewed, in person or on television, the twin towers of the World
Trade Center implode, the Pentagon smolder, and the wreckage
of United Airlines Flight 93 in rural Pennsylvania, airplane pas-
sengers clamor for one thing-safety. Yet, even amidst the
ratcheting-up of airport security, the addition of the Office of
Homeland Security, and the strengthening of national security,
safety is not guaranteed.
Prior to September 11 th, few lawmakers, authorities, journal-
ists, or citizens focused on preventing American airliners from
slamming into skyscrapers and government buildings. Prior to
these acts of terror, the aviation industry buzzed about mergers,
air rage, e-tickets, or strikes. Americans must concede, as well as
lawmakers, pundits, and aviation professionals, that the laws,
regulations, and administrative agencies were not adequately
prepared or proportionate to prevent this massive terrorist at-
tack. Our current legal framework did not support the neces-
sary security, safety, and prevention mechanisms.
While the United States was not prepared for this terrorist at-
tack and unable to prevent it, our law was able to deal with the
aftermath of this aviation disaster because of the 1996 enact-
ment of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act ("ADFAA")'
and the expedited enactment of the Air Transportation Safety
See Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Aviation Disaster Act]. For a current NTSB
report on aviation disaster family assistance, see http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/
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and System Stabilization Act of 2001 ("ATSSSA"). 2 The ADFAA
portioned out responsibilities in an integrated and systematic
fashion: (1) it granted the airlines primary responsibility for no-
tifying and supporting families after a disaster;3 (2) it called
upon air carriers to provide support services such as counseling,
emotional care, health care, child care, and food and shelter;4
(3) it required that the airline funnel accurate and timely infor-
mation to the survivors and the victims' families;5 and (4) it pro-
hibited unsolicited communication by an attorney or potential
party to the litigation for forty-five days following the date of the
accident.6 The legal community may feel that the solicitation
moratorium is the pivotal provision, but the airline industry, the
carriers, the NTSB, and the families who lobbied for the Act
believed that the entire 1996 enactment was a necessary and tri-
umphant victory.7 No one contemplated that the ADFAA would
aid the United States in responding to the unprecedented Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terror attacks on American soil. The ATSSSA
supplies the economic ying to the ADFAA's sympathetic yang
and attempts to sustain the aviation industry.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE ARTICLE
The following section of this article, Section Two, will follow
the historical development of the ADFAA. It will also focus on
the facts and circumstances catalyzing the government's deci-
sion to enact this statutory scheme. Section Three will trace
both the statutory and regulatory authority girding the Act, as
well as the statutory and regulatory development before and af-
ter the 1996 version of the ADFAA.
2000/spc0001.htm> and download the August, 1, 2000 Federal Family Assistance
Plan for Aviation Disasters.
2 See Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter System Stabilization Act].
3 Id. §§ 1136(a)(1)-(2), (e)(1)-(2), 41113(b)(1)-(3).
4 Id. §§ 1136(a)(2), (c)(1)-(5), 41113(a)(4), (10).
5 Id. §§ 1136(e)(1)-(2); 41113(b)(1), (2), (8), (14).
6 Id. § 1136(g) (2).
7 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. H10534-40 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Shuster). Shuster, a Pennsylvania Representative, moved to pass the Avia-
tion Disaster Family Assistance Act requiring the NTSB to take actions in support
of families involved in aircraft accidents. During the floor discussion, speakers
mentioned several names and entities who lobbied for the Act such as the fami-
lies from the Valujet, TWA, and Pan AM 103 crashes, the president of the Na-
tional Air Disaster Alliance, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Vice
President Gore's White House Commission on Aviation Security, and the Red
Cross.
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Section Four details each provision contained in the Act and
parses the statutory language. Section Four addresses in turn,
the parties to the ADFAA (the air carriers, the NTSB, the inde-
pendent nonprofit, the attorneys, and the victims) and discusses
each party's responsibility and potential liability under the Act,
including the application of the facts of September 11th to the
Act's provisions. Next, Section Five contains a look at the
amendments made to the ADFAA, both before and after Sep-
tember l1th, as well as the regulations written in the five years
since its passage. In addition, Section Five contains a discussion
of the ATSSSA passed on September 22, 2001.
Possible future amendments are set forth in Section Six and
involve concerns of attorneys, air carriers, and support teams.
Finally, Section Seven discusses the Red Cross's involvement in
its pairing with the air carriers under the ADFAA, and Section
Eight examines the role played by medical examiners in post-
disaster response. In conclusion, the ADFAA and its corollary,
the Foreign Air Carrier Family Support Act ("FACFSA"), are
laudatory laws that have served our nation well in the aftermath
of September 11th. It remains to be seen if Congress will
strengthen these laws in response to the terrorist attacks, or
whether Congress will lessen the Act's demands in light of the
new knowledge that the ADFAA can deplete the airlines' eco-
nomic resources when the air carrier is already suffering from
internal costs, razor-thin margins, and decreased public trust.
The September 11th disaster catalyzed fast-track subsidy
legislation.'
II. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE ACT
In March 2000, the House of Representatives discussed the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century.9 The reform act contained several changes to the
1996 Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act. Representative
Reynolds, introducing the 2000 bill, explained that the ADFAA
was originally created in the wake of Valujet and other crashes
8 On September 22, 2001, Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, supra note 2. The Act aims to "preserve the continued
viability of the United States air transportation system," and to "compensate air
carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on
the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001."
q 146 CONG. REc. H1002 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2000); see also Pub. L. No. 106-181,
114 Stat. 61 [hereinafter Wendell H. Ford Act]. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century is colloquially called "Air 21."
FAILING TO PREVENT THE TRA GEDY
because families did not receive accurate or timely
information. 0
From the outset, the victims' family groups were a strong, vo-
cal, and determined force in pushing the legislation through
both the House and Senate. In fact, during the genesis of the
1996 Act, family members affected by each crash testified before
the House following the tragedies." For example, one victim's
sister did not receive any information, help, personal effects, re-
mains, or counseling from Valujet after the crash.' 2 And even
eight years after the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist bombing over
Lockerbie, Scotland, the president of the Victims of Pan Am
Flight 103 came to testify about the "heart-wrenching stories of
callous behavior toward our family members."'' 3
These families' demands convinced Jim Hall, then Chairman
of the National Transportation Safety Board, to convey to the
House that he was "ready to work with [Congress], with family
members, and with the industry to find a solution."' 4 Chairman
Hall stated that the family members of loved ones killed in
USAir Flight 427 on September 8, 1994 were the first organized
group to demand that the NTSB recognize them as such.' 5 This
phenomenon reminded Chairman Hall that "[t]he family mem-
bers of that accident and every tragic transportation accident
are taxpayers. They pay my salary, and they pay for the investiga-
tive work of the NTSB. Within reason and within the resources
available to us, I believe we must be responsive .... We rely on
the public's support of our recommendations to improve
safety."'
6
While the USAir accident and the subsequent congressional
hearing incited this legislative movement, the two major 1996
10 146 CONG. REC. H1002 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Reynolds).
II See, e.g., Treatment of Families After Airline Accidents: Testimony Before the House
Subcomm. on Aviation, 104th Cong. (1996), available at 1996 WL 338310
(F.D.C.H.) (statement of Richard P. Kessler, Jr., husband of passenger on Valujet
Flight 592).
12 Id.
13 Aid for Families of Air Crash Victims: Hearing on H.R. 3923, The Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996 Before the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure Sub-
comm. on Aviation, 104th Cong. (1996), available at 1996 WL 502058 (F.D.C.H.)
(statement of George H. Williams, President of Victims of Pan Am Flight 103).
14 Treatment of Families After Airline Accidents: Testimony Before the House Comm. on
Transp.& Infrastructure Subcomm. on Aviation, 104th Cong. (1996), available at
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disasters-Valujet's crash in the Florida Everglades and TWA's
New York takeoff crash-stoked the coals and created a sense of
urgency.' 7 Congress passed the legislation within that year.
President William J. Clinton posited support shortly before
the bill passed through the House. The President issued a mem-
orandum on the subject of "Assistance to Families Affected by
Aviation and other Transportation Disasters." 8 He asked the
NTSB to take the lead position in investigating transportation
disasters by providing timely and accurate information to the
families of victims, ensuring family members' ability to travel to
the disaster site, and by cooperating with relief organizations
like the Red Cross to provide "some small measure of comfort to
families that have suffered grievous loss."' 9 So, on September
18, 1996, the House of Representatives passed the bill with 401
"yeas," 28 "not voting," and only 4 "nays."''2 On October 9, 1996,
President Clinton signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization
Act, containing the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act, into
law. "1
Due to the positive inception and reception of the ADFAA,
Congress expanded the scope of the assistance program to
reach families of passengers involved in foreign air carrier acci-
dents occurring within the United States.22 The Foreign Air
Carrier Family Support Act was signed into law in December of
1997, only four months after the Korean Air crash southwest of
Guam. 3 Only 29 of the 254 passengers survived the accident.
The victims' families reported massive notification delays caused
by Korean Air's lack of notification procedures and passenger
manifest information.2 4 Korean Air's post-accident problems
prompted the speedy enactment of FACFSA.
17 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Little-Known Law Helps Loved Ones of Air Crash
Victims Cope, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A5, available at 2000 WL25926708.
I, President's Memorandum for Secretary of State, Defense, Health and
Human Services, Transportation, the Attorney General, the Director of the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency, and the Chairman of the NTSB, Concern-
ing the Assistance to Families Affected by Aviation and Other Transportation
Disasters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1686 (Sept. 16, 1996).
1 Id.
2.0 142 CONG. REc. H10552 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996).
21 See Aviation Disaster Act, supra note 1.
'2' See 49 U.S.C. § 41313 (1997).
23 See DOT Rules and Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 8258, 8261-2 (Feb. 18, 1998)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 243).
24 Id.
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The Foreign Air Carrier Family Support Act is similar in scope
and substance to its precursor. But due to foreign law conflicts,
the FACFSA allows foreign air carriers to make substitutionary
provisions in order to be consistent with international obliga-
tions. 25 Following the 1996 enactment of the ADFAA and the
1997 additional legislation contained in the FACFSA, the NTSB
next urged the International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO") to implement a program to support victims and fami-
lies in international aviation accidents. 26 The NTSB submitted
Working Paper 31, containing resolutions concerning ICAO's
need to develop guidance for States in dealing with families fol-
lowing aviation disasters. Following this 1998 Convention
speech, the ICAO began to draft such standards. Currently,
standards have not been released, but reports substantiate the
ICAO's continued efforts to write guidelines for member
States. 2-
Before terrorists hijacked American Airlines Flights 11 and 77
and United Airlines Flights 93 and 175 on September I1th, the
ADFAA/FACFSA responded on four prior occasions-Alaska
Airlines flight 261 (January 31, 2000), American Airlines flight
1420 (June 1, 1999), EgyptAir flight 990 (Oct. 31, 1999), and
Swissair flight 111 (September 2, 1998). Following September




The 1996 ValuJet tragedy motivated a strong push from a pub-
lic constituency and pushed the ADFAA through during the
Clinton Administration; however, the Act's scaffolding was built
during President George H.W. Bush's tenancy in the White
House. 29 Following the 1988 Pan Am terrorist attack over Lock-
erbie, Scotland, the United States had widespread problems
25 49 U.S.C. § 41313.
26 See Transcript of Introduction of Family Assistance Paper by Jim Hall, Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board Before the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion Assembly, 32nd Sess., Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Sept. 25, 1998.
27 The working paper can be downloaded from the DOT's website. To retrieve
the paper, see <http://www.itsasafety.org/Speeches/jh980925.htm>.
28 See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 17.
29 See Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (Aug. 4, 1989) (President's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism). President Bush's executive
order established the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terror-
ism to study the prevention of aviation terrorism and to "investigate practices,
2002]
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identifying passengers and informing families." Moreover, the
lack of response procedures forced the Department of State to
wait more than seven hours to receive accurate Pan Am passen-
ger manifest information." Thus, and after the Pan Am terror-
ist bombing, Congress passed the Aviation Security
Improvement Act.3 2 This legislation, called "ASIA 90," amended
the Federal Aviation Act.3
The focus of ASIA 90 concerned domestic aviation disasters
occurring outside the United States. 34 The 1990 Act did not ap-
ply the security mandates to domestic flights within the United
States; the provisions only applied to flights outside of the
United States 5.3 Regulations adopted pursuant to the 1990 Act3 6
were designed to make family notification possible by requiring
airlines to maintain a list of passenger names (and passport
number, contact name, and contact telephone number, if possi-
ble). Airlines use these passenger lists to notify families in the
event of a crash.
The 1990 Act requires that if a crash involving a domestic air-
line occurs outside the United States, the air carrier must pro-
vide the Secretary of State with the flight's passenger manifest
within one hour of notification of the disaster v.3  Even if the
one-hour deadline is not reasonably feasible, the air carrier
must inform the State Department as "expeditiously as possible"
within a three-hour outer time limit.3 8 The Secretary of Trans-
portation requires that the passenger manifest include: each
passenger's full name, a contact name and telephone number
for each passenger, and if applicable, the passenger's passport
number.3 9 During the period of the Act's enactment, the Secre-
tary of Transportation asked two additional questions: (1)
whether air carriers should be required to collect this manifest
policies, and laws with respect to the treatment of families of victims of terrorist
acts." Id.
30 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (Mar. 13, 1997). This document can also be found
online at <http://www.epic.org.privacy/faa/passenger-manifest_397>.
31 63 Fed. Reg. 8258 (Feb. 18, 1998).
32 Pub. L. No. 101-604, § 203(a), 104 Stat. 3066 (1990) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 44901) [hereinafter ASIA 90].
"3 Pub. L. No. 85-726 § 410, 72 Stat. 769 (1958).
34 ASIA 90, supra note 32, § 203.
3-1 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (Mar. 13, 1997).
36 14 C.F.R. pt. 243.
37 49 U.S.C. § 44909(a) (1) (A).
38 Id. § 44909(a)(1)(B).
39 Id. § 44909 (a) (1) (B) (2).
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information as a precondition to boarding the plane; and (2)
whether foreign air carriers should be held to the same notifica-
tion timeline and manifest collection procedures.4 ° Neither of
these options has been put into force.
After passage of ASIA 90, during President Bush's "Regulatory
Moratorium and Review,"'" the Department of Transportation
("DOT") sent out several Advanced Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking ("ANPRM"), requesting input on how to efficiently
implement both the new statutory requirements as well as fur-
ther comments on passenger-manifest information collection.42
Most airlines responded by stating that new and more thorough
manifest information collection would substantially, and poten-
tially prohibitively, increase costs and administrative
difficulties.43
Regarding these air carrier comments, as well as considering
the low frequency of aviation disasters, the DOT did not imme-
diately write any companion regulations. The airlines com-
mented that while aviation disasters are public and tragic, the
U.S. air carriers' fatal accident rate is approximately two per ten
million departures.44 Nevertheless, in the few years following
the 1990 ANPRM, several events conspired to move the DOT to
pen some regulatory provisions.45
In 1998, the DOT enacted federal regulations covering the
relationships between air carriers, air taxis, charter flights, for-
eign air carriers, foreign relations, reporting and record-keep-
ing requirements, security, and passenger manifests.46 The
40 Id. § 44909(b).
41 See 63 Fed. Reg. 8258, 8258-59 (Feb. 18, 1998). The "Regulatory Morato-
rium and Review" is a period following a presidential election during which fed-
eral agencies are to focus on pressing concerns of health and public safety. The
federal agencies are instructed to issue only rules that are necessary to implement
public health and safety solutions.
42 See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 3810 (Jan. 31, 1991); 61 Fed. Reg. 10706 (Mar. 15,
1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 47692 (Sept. 10, 1996).
43 See 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (Mar. 13, 1997).
44 Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 17.
45 The catalyzing events included a December 20, 1995, American Airlines
crash near Cali, Columbia, where the carrier significantly delayed transmitting a
complete passenger manifest to the State Department. Also, a DOT-sponsored
public meeting drew eighty participants who agreed to further investigate the
manifest issues. Next, Vice President Al Gore's White House Commission on Avi-
ation Safety and Security strongly supported speedy implementation of the 1990
Aviation Security Improvement Act, as well as adding the manifest collection re-
quirements to domestic flights.
46 14 C.F.R. pt. 243.
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DOT used the power inherent to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion's broad regulatory authority to ensure air carriers' "safe and
adequate interstate air transportation.""v Furthermore, the Sec-
retary has rulemaking powers through 49 U.S.C. § 40113 to pro-
vide necessary "regulations, standards, . . . procedures, and...
orders."48 And to force air carrier cooperation, the Secretary
can hold carriers accountable through criminal and civil penal-
ties for carriers' failures or refusals to comply.49
Related historical provisions previously required large certi-
fied air carriers to log passenger names for each charter or
scheduled flight.5" History reveals, however, that air carriers col-
lected nothing more than a surname and first initial. Even
though seventy-five percent of flight reservations were made
through a travel agent who did not pass on identification infor-
mation to the air carrier, the carrier did not ask for more identi-
fying information."'
Thus, the 1998 regulations promulgated by the DOT pro-
posed to ensure "prompt and adequate information in case of
an aviation disaster on covered flight segments. '5 2 The covered
flight segments are passenger-carrying flights to or from the
United States (i.e. either the departure or arrival point is within
U.S. territory)." Flights where both take-off and arrival are
within the United States are not covered flight segments under
these regulations. The regulation further narrows its scope by
defining "aviation disaster" as an occurrence involving death or
serious injury caused by a "crash, fire, collision, sabotage or acci-
dent ... missing aircraft; or [a]n act of air piracy.""
47 49 U.S.C. § 41702.
48 Id. § 40113(a). The DOT also based its permission to regulate on the Secre-
tary's broad power to require certain reports and records. See id. §§ 41708,
41709, 41711 (allowing the Secretary to require periodic or reoccurring report-
ing; the Secretary can also determine the form of the records and reports; the
Secretary can inspect an air carrier's records; the Secretary can also make man-
agement and/or business probes; and the Secretary can basically decide to get
any information determined reasonably necessary "to carry out the inquiry."); id.
§ 41711.
49 Id. §§ 46301, 46310, 46316. For a general discussion of sources of air law
authority, see also David T. Norton, Crisis Management Planning for Small Air Carri-
ers, Aircraft Parts Manufacturers, Installers or Maintainers, and Other Aviation Industry
Participants, 66J. AIR L. & CoM. 505 (2001).
50 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.693(e).
51 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (Mar. 13, 1997).
52 14 C.F.R. § 243.1.
53 Id. § 243.3.
54 Id.
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In the event of an aviation disaster, this regulatory scheme re-
quires an air carrier to inform the Department of State, the
Managing Director of Overseas Citizen Services, and the Bureau
of Consular Affairs within three hours after learning of the disas-
ter." And upon the NTSB's request, the air carrier must submit
the information to the NTSB-appointed Director of Family Sup-
port Services.56 Subpart (c) of section 243.11 aids the NTSB in
coordinating its support services required by the ADFAA.
Additionally, the 1998 regulations contain a choice-of-law pro-
vision.57 If an airline petitions the DOT, claiming the foreign
countries that the carrier serves will not allow the required infor-
mation to be collected, solicited, or transmitted, the airline can
obtain a waiver. 51 Such waiver does not negate all the informa-
tion requirements; the waiver will only work to the extent that
the regulation conflicts with foreign law.59 Conflicts with for-
eign law will be listed and kept up to date by the DOT in OST
Docket 98-3305.6o
Finally, the regulations warn air carriers that the DOT will be
able to bring enforcement actions against non-complying air-
lines.6' To ensure both compliance and effectiveness, the DOT
can request, at any time, the airline's passenger manifest or
emergency contact list.62 If the DOT determines an airline's col-
lection system to be sub-par, the DOT can require that improve-
ments be made within a certain timeframe The 1998
regulations help buttress the 1996 Aviation Disaster Family Assis-
tance Act. The regulations detail nuts-and-bolts issues such as
information collection, reporting, and transmission, yet the reg-
ulations conspicuously exclude information collection for
purely domestic flights.
The 1998 DOT information collection requirements were not
daring or progressive. While the DOT requires an air carrier to
collect the full names of U.S. citizens before a passenger is al-
lowed to board, the DOT only requires a solicitation (not a col-
lection) of an emergency contact.64  Even though these
55 Id. § 243.11.
56 Id. § 243.11(c).
57 14 C.F.R. § 243.15,
58 Id. § 243.15(a)-(b).
59 Id. § 243.15(a).
- Id. § 243.15(d).
61 14 C.F.R. § 243.17.
62 Id.
63 Id.
- Id. § 243.7.
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regulations were not groundbreaking, the DOT did include pri-
vacy protections. The collected information is regarded as pri-
vate. The passengers' contact information is kept confidential
and released only to the DOT, the Department of State, or to
the NTSB upon NTSB request. 5 Furthermore, the regulation
states that the collected information is to be used only for notifi-
cation of families after an aviation disaster.66 These privacy re-
quirements prevent commercial airlines from using the lists for
future advertising, business generation, or marketing. In short,
confidentiality is mandated, and commercial use is specifically
prohibited.
The case Wallman v. Tower Air,67 filed in the northern district
of California, illustrates the potential conflicts ripe in such confi-
dentiality protection. While 14 C.F.R. part 243 seems to require
absolute confidentiality and limit release to specifically named
governmental aviation authorities, the court found that the avia-
tion regulation could be pierced by rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.6" The issue was presented before the magis-
trate judge on a discovery matter after the district judge bifur-
cated the action.""- The split created initial focus on discovery
before certifying the class for a class action suit.
The plaintiff was a passenger on Tower Air and allegedly ex-
perienced mental anguish and personal injury when-after a
bright red flash was emitted from near the plane's left engine-
the aircraft lurched violently to the left, but then landed safely. 70
Immediately after the lurch, the flight attendants shouted "hys-
terically" and asked the passengers to prepare for an emergency
landing. Plaintiff claimed that the flight crew made no attempt
to calm, console, or reassure the passengers. After the hurried
landing, the upset passengers started a near-riot, and New York
police were called to the scene.
After the district court bifurcated the action, the plaintiff filed
his discovery plan requesting Tower Air's passenger list. The
plaintiff argued that the list was necessary to identify potential
members of the class, as well as to determine if the class would
meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requirements of
numerosity and typicality. Defendant moved to block discovery
65 Id. § 243.9(c).
6 14 C.F.R. § 243.9(d).
(7 189 F.R.D. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
- Id. at 569.
69 Id. at 567.
70 Id.
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of the passenger list, arguing that the passenger list was confi-
dential and would violate passengers' privacy rights.7 1
The magistrate concluded that the 1990 Aviation Security Im-
provement Act 72 and the companion regulations73 did not place
the passenger list in an impenetrable position and that the rules
of civil procedure granted any needed protection.7 4 The magis-
trate did not read into the aviation law any special privilege that
would trump the relevancy of the passenger list. The judge did
discuss the confidentiality provisions in 14 C.F.R. parts 243.9(b)
and (d), but found that the plaintiff needed the list to contact
potential witnesses and plaintiffs with potentially relevant infor-
mation regarding the incident.71
The court compared the plaintiff's request to cases where par-
ties desire to discover information protected under the Privacy
Act.76 The court found no statutory basis to replace the discov-
ery standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45 (b) 77
with stricter criteria.78 Thus, the court held that the discovery
request did not turn on a privilege analysis, but rather de-
pended on discovery and protective order standards. 79 The
magistrate did find good cause for issuing a protective order,
namely to limit access to the passengers' names and phone num-
bers to the plaintiff, his counsel, counsel's staff, and the court.
The magistrate also ordered that following the litigation, the list
should either be returned to Tower Air or destroyed.8 ° While
the magistrate used a discovery analysis to allow discovery under
protective order, the judge noted:
[t] he purpose of collecting the passenger list and contact list is to
enable the State Department and the [NTSB] to reach family
71 Id. at 567-68.
72 See Pub. L. No. 101-604, § 203(a), 104 Stat. 3066 (1990).
73 14 C.F.R. pt. 243.
74 See Wallman v. Tower Air, 189 F.R.D. 566, 569 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
75 Id. at 568.
76 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982); Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 187 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1999);
Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
77 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require each party to submit names of
people "likely to have discoverable information relevant to the disputed
facts .. " FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1)(A). While 26(b)(1) limits a party's discovery
of privileged information, rule 26(c) allows the court to issue a protective order
limiting access and use of the protected information. Rule 45(c) (3) allows the
court to "quash or modify" a subpoena if it requires disclosure of "privileged or
other protected matter."
78 Wallman, 189 F.R.D. at 569.
79 Id. at 569.
80 Id. at 569-70.
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members of passengers who have been seriously injured or killed
in a plane crash. The presumption is that the passengers are in-
capacitated and cannot contact their families themselves.8"
The magistrate also noted that the Tower Air incident was not
a crash, no passengers were killed, and the incident may not
meet the definition of "aviation disaster. '8 2 While this decision
points out a hole in the regulation's privacy protection, this de-
cision does not render the confidentiality provision ineffective,
for the court determined that even if the manifest information
was discoverable, a protective order was necessary to protect the
passengers' privacy. Wallman v. Tower Air represents the only
published case citing the ADFAA.
IV. THE AVIATION DISASTER FAMILY ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1996
A. AIR CARRIER RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Submission of Assistance Plans
To begin with, the ADFAA requires all air carriers holding
certificates of public convenience and necessity to submit "a
plan for addressing the needs of the families of passengers in-
volved in any aircraft accident involving an aircraft of the air
carrier and resulting in a major loss of life."83 The air carriers'
plans were due to the Secretary and Chairman of the NTSB six
months after this provision's enactment8 4 and, after this six-
month window, all carriers are required to submit the plan as
part of the air carrier's application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.8 5 Therefore, at the present time, all
operating commercial air carriers and charter carriers with cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity have submitted
their plans to address families' needs in the case of an aviation
disaster. It remains to be seen, after September 11th, if the
NTSB or possible amendments to the ADFAA will require revi-
sions to the air carriers' plans or refinements of the statute's use
of the phrases "major loss of life" and "aircraft accident."
It is undeniable that the September 11th aviation disasters il-
lustrated a "major loss of life," '86 yet the planned violence of Sep-
81 Id. at 568.
82 Id.
8.3 49 U.S.C. § 41113(a).
84 Id.
85 Id. § 41113(c).
86 Id. § 41113(a).
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tember 11th was not an accident. The ADFAA uses the term,
"aircraft accident,"'' 7 and such language, on its face, seems to
exclude premeditated air terrorism; however, §1136(h)(1) in-
cludes "any aviation disaster regardless of its cause or suspected
cause."88 In contrast, the statute does not specify how many
deaths constitute a "major loss of life." For example, must a car-
rier put the plan in action if only two people are killed? Most
likely, the phrase "major loss of life" would not be construed in a
limited fashion, and the plan's procedures would be conducted
on a more restricted scale.
2. A Plan's Minimum Requirements
The provision that delineates what procedures the carriers
must put into the plan states that the listed items are minimum
requirements.89 It must be noted, however, that subsection (f),
which was added in 1998, states that nothing in the require-
ments may be construed as limiting the air carrier's actions and
obligations in providing assistance. ° This addition will work to
prevent airlines from finding statutory loopholes or circum-
venting their duties. In addition, the carrier's plan must contain
an assurance that it "will commit sufficient resources to carry out
the plan."'" In short, the air carrier cannot make empty
promises; each airline must submit an affirmative declaration
that it will support and follow the Act. The carrier must,
through a good faith attempt, allocate adequate resources and
manpower to create, maintain, and execute the plan. Because
of duties created by the ADFAA and promises made in the carri-
ers' plans, both United Airlines and American Airlines may have
to expend large amounts of financial and human resources in
supporting the families of the September 11 th attacks regardless
of potential limits on tort liability and federal bailouts.
Besides the promise of resource commitment, the carrier's
plan must also contain other assurances, such as to notify, to
provide passenger lists, to update information, to provide re-
mains and personal possessions, to consult the families about
memorials and monuments, and to cooperate with the support
service. For instance, the carrier must provide an assurance that
87 Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1136(h)(1).
-9 See id. § 41113(b).
90 Id. § 41113(f).
9-1 Id. § 41113(b)(13).
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as soon as the air carrier confirms that a certain passenger was
aboard the aircraft, the carrier must notify the family before
public notice, and if practicable, in person.9 2 Thus, United Air-
lines and American Airlines made assurances that before the
public knew that Captain Jason Dahl and first officer Leroy Ho-
mer piloted United Flight 93 or that Todd Beamer was the pas-
senger whose pregnant wife and two children were left behind,
the airlines would make a best-efforts attempt to contact their
families prior to releasing the information to the swarm of in-
quiring journalists. In sum, these required assurances lay out
what services the carrier must provide and within what bounds
these services will be performed.
3. Performance of the Assistance Plan
a. Information Responsibilities
Once an "accident" occurs, the air carrier becomes responsi-
ble for several related post-accident responses. First, the carrier
will have to set up, publicize, and staff a toll-free telephone line
that passengers' families can call for information.13 For in-
stance, the assistance plans required the airlines to publish the
multitude of contact and information telephone numbers dis-
played on every major television station. Secondly, an airline,
before making any passenger names public, must first notify the
families through a "suitably trained individual. . . ."" The pre-
ferred notification method is in person, but face-to-face commu-
nication is only mandated "to the extent practicable."95 The
carrier must periodically update this information as the names
of passengers are verified.96 A sad disparity to note is that, fol-
lowing the September 11 th disaster, the families of the airplane
passengers were the only ones guaranteed to be notified of the
deaths of their loved ones. The families of workers in the Penta-
gon and World Trade Center were unaided by any statutory no-
tification requirements.
b. Personal and Privacy Responsibilities
After performing its notification duties, the carrier must con-
tinue to assist the affected families. The carrier must cooperate
'2 Id. § 41113(b)(2)-(3).
93 49 U.S.C. § 41113(b)(1).
94 Id. § 41113(b)(2)-(3).
,,- Id. § 41113(b)(3).
96 Id. § 41113(b)(4).
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with the independent, NTSB-appointed non-profit, (i.e, the Red
Cross), to provide an appropriate level of aid and support.97
The carrier must "assist" the passenger's family in traveling to
the crash site, as well as provide for their physical needs while at
the accident location.98 Presumably, this means that the air car-
rier must purchase plane, bus, or boat passes, provide for a
rental car, and pay for the family's lodging and food. Yet, the
use of the word "assist" leaves room for argument as to what type
of provisions meet the mandatory floor. For example, are Amer-
ican Airlines and United Airlines required to fly in all family
members from around the globe? And, who will calculate what
constitutes adequate support and assistance? The recovery time
required by the September 1lth terrorist attack is currently im-
measurable-how are the airlines to measure their sufficiency?
Additionally, an air carrier must also respect a family's wishes
for burial, memorial, or religious ceremony. The carrier must
first consult with the family before disposing of the remains or
any of the passenger's personal possessions,99 and any un-
claimed possessions must be retained by the carrier for a mini-
mum of eighteen months. 00 If needed for an investigation,
however, the carrier can retain either remains or personal ef-
fects.' 0 ' It is uncertain whether any remains or effects of the
airline passengers will be recovered from Ground Zero, the Pen-
tagon, or Pennsylvania following the disaster-site excavation and
government investigation.
Finally, the air carrier must get the families' input for any
monument erected in memory of the passengers.1 0 2 This obliga-
tion is complicated by the multifaceted nature of the September
11th disaster. Families and friends of non-passengers-indeed,
people across the Nation and around the globe-may desire to
participate in the creation of a memorial. A strict construction
of this provision would impose a Herculean task on United and
American.
B. AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
While the ADFAA focuses on providing support to victims of
aviation disasters, an air carrier could incur liability under 49
07 Id. § 41113 (b) (10).
98 49 U.S.C. § 41113(b)(12).
99 Id. § 41113(b)(5).
- Id. § 41113(b)(7).
10, Id. § 41113(b)(6).102 Id. § 41113 (b) (8).
2002] 205
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
U.S.C. § 41113 if the airline commits intentional misconduct or
is grossly negligent in providing the required passenger list.'
0 3 If
the air carrier does not exhibit this level of scienter, however,
the carrier is protected by limited liability if it provides the pas-
senger list pursuant to their disaster assistance plan.11 4 This
limit on liability protects the air carrier from having to pay dam-
ages for incorrectly, but innocently, naming a passenger on the
victims' list or failing to correctly name a fallen passenger. Nev-
ertheless, this narrow protection from exposure appears insuffi-
cient to protect the airlines from mass tort liability following the
September 11 th attacks; both American Airlines and United Air-
lines lobbied for a ceiling on the potential litigation exposure
coupled with the creation of a streamlined compensation system
for disaster victims. 10 5 The resulting legislative fix, the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 10 6 reconciles
these competing interests by authorizing payments to claim-
ants'07 who waive their right to file civil actions for damages sus-
tained as a result of September 11th. This legislative salve also
relieves the airlines of punitive damages and general damages in
excess of $100,000,000 if third parties file claims based on acts of
terrorism committed within the 180-day period following Sep-
tember 22, 2001-the date of enactment. The ATSSSA will be
discussed in full in Section V, Part B.
The air carrier might also be exposed to liability under 49
U.S.C. § 1136 if the carrier hinders support services or the sup-
port providers. 08 The carrier is prohibited from impeding the
NTSB or the non-profit organization from carrying out their re-
sponsibilities.0 9 Furthermore, the airline cannot encumber or
block contact and communication between the families of pas-
sengers involved in the accident.110
In a related manner, the carrier might be liable for not pro-
viding enough financial support to the support-service pro-
vider. 11 The carrier must, to the fullest extent possible,
,03 49 U.S.C. § 41113(d).
104 Id.
105 Bob Van Voris, Litigation on Hold; Terrorists Did the Deeds, But Others Could
Face Suits, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1, 2001, at 1.
106 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2.
107 See id. "Claimant" is a defined term. For a full discussion of this legislation,
see infra Part V.B.
10 See 49 U.S.C. §1136(g) (1).
109 Id.
110 Id.
"I ld. § 1136(f).
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cooperate and coordinate with the service provider so that the
carrier's resources can be used to carry out the organization's
responsibilities of care, counseling, support, and communica-
tion. 112 With the corollary promise by the carrier to allocate suf-
ficient funds to the execution of their family assistance plan,
there is an expectation of meeting a certain level of funding and
participation. Even though it is yet to be drawn, the carriers'
financial and resource expenditures following the September
11th attacks may sketch out a line in the sand that a carrier must
cross in order to be protected from liability for failure to fund or
cooperate. If the expectations are sky-high, the results may be
bankrupt airlines and disable the national aviation transporta-
tion system.
Finally, the airline might be exposed to liability under 49
U.S.C. § 113 6 (g) (3). This provision prohibits individual States
and political subdivisions from preventing the carrier's furnish-
ing of emotional support, counseling and mental-health assis-
tance. 11 While the statute's language does not include the air
carrier, it seems to hint at the underlying policy that no entity
can impede or hinder the process of servicing the disaster vic-
tims. It remains to be seen whether air carriers are exposed to
liability under this provision.
Furthermore, controversy surrounds an airline's use of
caregivers. The problem arises from the fact that most passen-
gers are not aware of the ADFAA. Moreover, the vast majority of
passengers do not have knowledge of the complex system of
agencies, regulations, requirements, and responsibilities regard-
ing airline safety, security, and service. After an accident, a pas-
senger is not likely to know what a "caregiver" is, who provides
the caregiver, and what underlying loyalties motivate the
caregiver. As Paige Stockley, the surviving daughter of parents
killed in Alaska Airlines Flight 261, stated, "you don't know what
the Family Assistance Act is; you don't know what a care team
member is .... There is this person from [the airline] telling
you they are there for you and they are going to see you
through."' 4 Stockley also noted that "you are not angry with
[the airline] at this point. You are in shock. They are making
the reservations. They are making cash available."'"1 5 Shockley
112 Id.
113 49 U.S.C. § 113 6 (g)( 3 ).
114 Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 17.
115 Id.
2002] 207
208 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [67
concluded that airline employees are not suited for the job, yet
the ADFAA and regulations do not inform us as to who can
serve as a caregiver. Can it be an airline employee? How much
conflict of interest will be tolerated?
C. NTSB RESPONSIBILITIES
The NTSB is the agency that collects the plans for addressing
the needs of families of passengers involved in an aviation disas-
ter. I" Following the enactment of the ADFAA, the NTSB also
had the task of denying certificates of public convenience and
necessity to air carriers not filing a family assistance plan."
17
The NTSB's role in an aviation disaster is central and sweep-
ing."" Under the ADFAA, the NTSB serves as the federal gov-
ernment's primary force in recovering fatally injured passengers
and identifying the passengers killed in the airplane accident.
This duty applies when any air carrier, whether foreign or do-
mestic, crashes within U.S. territory.'19
Whether or not the NTSB has begun the investigation, the
Board must take action "as soon as practicable" after being noti-
fied of an aircraft accident resulting in a major loss of life.' 2 °
Following this notification, the NTSB must put together a team
of support \ersonnel.12 The Board must appoint an NTSB em-
ployee to serve as the "director of family support services." 122
The family support services director is the "point" person be-
tween the families and the federal government, as well as the
liaison between the families and the air carrier. As an NTSB
employee, the designee can broker information sharing be-
tween the parties with the benefit of federal backing and clout
and without the partiality of being employed by the airline. The
ADFAA does not specify whether the family support services di-
rector needs to have special training or certification. It is also
not clear whether the director must be a current employee or
can be brought in as an independent contractor. The statutory
language reads "shall be an employee," but either scenario
would most likely qualify under this phrase. 23
li See 49 U.S.C. § 41113(a).
117 See id. § 41113(c).
118 See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq.
119 See 49 U.S.C. § 1136(a)-(b).
120 Id. § 1136(a).
121 Id. § 1136(a)(1)-(2).
122 Id. § 1136(a)(1).
123 Id.
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Through the NTSB-appointed family services director, the
NTSB will obtain passenger lists with which to notify affected
families. 12 4 The director of family support services is responsible
for requesting from the foreign or domestic air carrier "the
names of the passengers that were aboard the aircraft involved
in the accident."'25 The air carrier and family services director
are indirectly in charge of making sure that the list is based on
the best information available when the director makes the re-
quest.12 6 Because the request is to be made "as soon as practica-
ble," 127 the first list most likely will not be complete. But the
passenger lists are of utmost importance because they deter-
mine which countries, jurisdictions, federal agencies, and third
parties will become involved.1 28 As a caveat, the statute reminds
both the family services director and the appointed organization
that the list may not be released to anyone unless the person is a
family member of the passenger and the director or organiza-
tion considers the release appropriate. 129 The ADFAA does not
define who qualifies as a family member. There is little gui-
dance as to which family members are close enough to get the
list and which family members are too far removed. Further-
more, the ADFAA does not suggest what the NTSB should do if
no family steps forward or if certain family members demand
information and may not be privy to it. For example, what if a
passenger was estranged from or disowned by his family, or the
ex-wife wants to know if her ex-husband was on the plane? What
if a passenger is part of a nontraditional family unit? It seems
that these questions are left to the discretion of the family ser-
vices director.
The NTSB has a continuing responsibility to ensure that the
families of passengers are individually informed about public
hearings and NTSB meetings concerning the accident. 30 Also,
if appropriate, the families must be allowed access to the hear-
ing or meeting. 31 Furthermore, the NTSB has a greater duty to
inform the families first-before any public briefing concerning




128 See generally Aaron Schildhaus et al., Aviation and Aerospace Law, 32 INT'L
LAw 437 (1998).
129 49 U.S.C. § 1136(d)(2) (Supp. 2001).
130 See id. § 1136(e)(1)-(2).
I'l Id. § 1136(e) (2).
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the accident's cause, the investigation's findings, or any other
pertinent information. 3 2 In light of the enormity of the Sep-
tember l1th attacks, the boundaries on access to certain infor-
mation are difficult to draw. How much information will be
passed on to the families? How much media sensitivity is
required?
The NTSB must also "designate an independent nonprofit or-
ganization, with experience in disasters and post-trauma com-
munication with families" to be primarily responsible for
"coordinating the emotional care and support of the families of
passengers involved in the accident."' 33 The ADFFA does man-
date air carrier cooperation in allowing and facilitating the or-
ganization,1 34 as well as providing adequate funding 135 and
reasonable compensation,13 6 but the organization still has the
primary role in providing support services.
D. INDEPENDENT NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION'S RESPONSIBILITIES
Currently, the American Red Cross is the flagship indepen-
dent nonprofit. 3 7 But the statute does not name the Red Cross
as the only possible appointee. 3 Groups such as volunteer air-
line caregivers, cross-airline teams, retirees, or family members
from previous crashes might also qualify under the ADFAA. For
example, in response to the "largest disaster ever to strike the
United States," the American Red Cross enlisted the partnership
of the Veterans Administration to staff grief counselors, mental
health workers, spiritual care advisors, and chaplains at the Fam-
ily Assistance Centers in New York City and the Pentagon, as well
as the crash site in rural Pennsylvania. '31
132 See id. § 1136(e)(1).
'33 Id. § 1136(a) (2).
134 49 U.S.C. § 41113(b)(10) (Supp. 2001).
,-15 Id. § 41113(b)(13).
136 Id. § 41113(b)(11).
17 The American Red Cross accepted the NTSB's invitation to provide its ser-
vices as the "independent nonprofit organization" required by the ADFAA. See
Michele Turk, Red Cross, NTSB Ink Deal to Help Aviation Victims' Families, Disaster-
Relief.org, at http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/980928NTSB/ (Sept. 28,
1998).
v's 49 U.S.C. § 1136(a)(1).
139 See VA's Ability to Respond to DOD Contingencies and National Emergen-
cies: Weapons of Mass Destruction Hearing, 2001 WL 26187102 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Congressional Testimony] (Congressional testimony ofJames Krueger, Executive
Vice President, American Red Cross).
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The qualifications required for status as an "independent
nonprofit" under the ADFAA have yet to be tested. Some con-
troversy, however, is building about the impartiality of team
members connected to the airline.14 ° The classic conflict-of-in-
terest problem surrounds this issue. Airline volunteers are em-
ployees of the airline and necessarily agents of the airline acting
on behalf of the air carrier's best interests. Yet the airline's
goals of warding off negative publicity, controlling costs, and re-
ducing potential litigation conflicts with the victims' interest in
immediate access to information, full compensation, and com-
plete disclosure.
Nevertheless, the designated organization bears the primary
responsibility in accomplishing the goals of the ADFAA. The
organization's primary allegiance is to the families of the passen-
gers. 4' While the air carrier will probably have a disaster re-
sponse team, the NTSB-appointed organization is the primary
entity charged with providing "mental health and counseling
services.""'1 2 The organization is also charged with making con-
tact and facilitating communication. The organization must
contact families who have traveled to the accident site and fami-
lies who are unable to get to the site.143 The organization must
educate the families as to the differing and specific roles of the
parties involved in the accident and post-accident activities, such
as the appointed organization, the government agencies, and
the air carrier. 4 4 The organization also has a continuing re-
sponsibility to keep the communication flowing to all affected
families until either the organization or the family services direc-
tor determines that the support is no longer warranted. 4 '
The designated organization is also charged with consulting
the family in arranging a suitable memorial service, if needed. 146
While consulting with the families, the organization must pro-
vide an environment where families are free, comfortable, and
protected, so that they may grieve in private.' 47 The Red Cross
and Veterans Administration's response to the September l1th
disaster illustrates this last provision. In addition to providing
140 See generally Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 17.
141 See 49 U.S.C. § 1136(c).
142 Id. § 1136(c)(1).
143 Id. § 1136(c) (3).
144 Id. § 1136(c) (4).
145 Id. § 1136(c) (3).
146 49 U.S.C. § 1136(c)(5).
147 Id. § 1136(c) (2).
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counseling services, the Red Cross and VA collaboration pro-
vided "respite centers," "service'centers," "shelters," and "medi-
cal facilities" where counselors could "listen to help rescue
workers," help "children through the trauma of losing their
home," and "help workers face their fears of returning to high
rise office buildings."'' 48
E. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION'S LIABILITIES
Before airlines were aware of the families' lobbying efforts or
were forced to take action by the enactment of the ADFAA, tele-
vision provided the only source of information for families
whose loved ones were involved in an airline accident.'4 9 Before
the ADFAA, airlines often waited two to three days before notify-
ing a family member of a loved one's death. Then, after the
agony of waiting over 48 hours, the sites were restricted and fam-
ilies were not allowed access or permission to visit or view.1 50
While a few days' wait may not appear substantial, it confuses
and torments the families as they attempt to make funeral plans,
work out details for a death certificate, execute the will, and file
claims for life insurance.' 51 For example, some of the Alaska
Airlines Flight 261 families were forced to hold vigil at an air-
port hotel, listening to an overhead reminder of their personal
tragedy.152 The smell of jet fuel and roar of the passing planes
was too much of a visceral reminder for them. They renamed
their lodging place, "Heartbreak Hotel."'153
Before the ADFAA, the focus of the NTSB and the airlines was
singular. The focus was on the airplane. Now that the airlines
are charged with notifying the families and providing the
needed logistical support, the focus is on both the airplane and
the people affected by the airplane accident. Now the airlines
must not only pick up the pieces of the fuselage, they must also
help to pick up the emotional pieces during the "shock time"
following an accident. But what is the standard for emotional
148 Congressional Testimony, supra note 139.
149 Leon Drouin Keith, Improvement Cited in Crash Response, AP ONLINE, Feb. 7,
2000, available at 2000 WL 12388916.
150 Id.
151 See Crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261; Families Press for Recover of Bodies in
Crash, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2000, available at 2000 WL 13946661.
152 Stevenson Swanson, Crash Victims' Families Make Concerns Heard Since the
7WA Disaster, Airlines and Agencies Have Worked to Better Aid Grief-Riven Relatives,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2929854.
153 Id.
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support? What is enough? What is too little, too much, too
nosy, too distant?
The statute's language is fuzzy: "suitable memorial service,"
"mental health and counseling services," "an environment
where families can grieve in private." These concepts can be
defined in a multitude of ways. What constitutes a suitable me-
morial service? Does it mean that the airline must spend a cer-
tain amount of money or fly in a certain number of family
members? What is a mental health service? Does it include
medication? What type of counseling shall be provided? Will
the counselor have to be licensed or a specialist in disaster or
trauma? What if the spiritual advisors engage in proselytizing?
The statute does not answer these questions, and the legisla-
tive history does not shed much light on the specific concepts or
services desired. Regardless of this vacuum, the airlines are vul-
nerable to these spaces in the statutory language. If the families
do not view the service providers as trustworthy or impartial or
independent, the distrust and suspicion could grow into a law-
suit or attach to a pending or yet-to-be filed wrongful death or
personal injury suit. Could the airline attempt to use the coun-
selors to broker settlements or dissuade families from filing suit?
The outcome of the new legislation contained in the Air Trans-
portation Safety and Stabilization Act, as well as the standards
set by the NTSB and the Red Cross following the September
11th attacks may serve to set either a floor or a ceiling on the
current statutory expectations.
F. ATroRNEY LIABILITY
The ADFAA places a moratorium on airplane chasing. For
forty-five days following an air-carrier accident, no attorney, as-
sociate, agent, employee, or representative of an attorney can
make an unsolicited communication to a passenger or a passen-
ger's relative.1 54 Federal law does not grant an independent
cause of action under the ADFAA, but attorneys will be held ac-
countable under state bar proceedings. For example, in Sterns v.
Lundberg,1'5 5 where two attorneys filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Indiana Su-
preme Court from proceeding with disciplinary proceedings
against the attorneys, the state disciplinary rules imposed duties
1-4 49 U.S.C. § 1136(g)(2). In the original act, the moratorium was 30 days,
but the 2000 amendments increased it to 45 days.
155 922 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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not contained in federal legislation. Following the 1992 crash of
a Kentucky Air National Guard cargo plane in Indiana, the at-
torneys mailed client solicitation materials to the victims' fami-
lies. Neither attorney was licensed to practice in Indiana.56
Soon after the solicitation came to light, the Indiana Supreme
Court publicly criticized the lawyers' conduct and initiated an
investigation. Following the investigation, the investigation's Ex-
ecutive Secretary, Lundberg, filed a grievance in order to begin
the official disciplinary proceedings against the attorneys.
Sterns and Murgatroyd, the lawyers who contacted the victims'
families, filed for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that
the Indiana Supreme Court had neither subject matter nor per-
sonal jurisdiction and to allow the disciplinary proceedings to
continue would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause. 5 7 The district court, however, refrained from inter-
fering with the state disciplinary proceedings, reasoning that the
regulation of attorneys' conduct is fundamentally an important
state interest, thus requiring a federal court to abstain pursuant
to the Younger doctrine. 58
Following the September l1th attacks, attorneys, both as pro-
fessionals and as citizens, struggle with the appropriate response
to the issues and liabilities involved. Corporately, the Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA") called for the plain-
tiffs' bar to eschew lawsuit filing, at least temporarily. 159
Nevertheless, because of families contacting lawyers, some re-
tainer agreements have already been signed. 60 ATLA is also
calling for lawyers to make this pledge, "We pledge to provide
free legal services to the terrorist attack victims who are eligible
and choose to make claims under the federal September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund."'"'
V. AMENDMENTS
A. AMENDMENTS PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Because the ADFAA is only five years old, not many legislative
changes have occurred since its enactment. In 1996, Section
156 Id. at 164, 166.
157 Id. at 164, 167.
158 Id. at 167-68; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
15) See http://www.atla.org/homepage/tragedy.htm.
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704 of Public Law 104-264 provided for the establishment of a
task force.162 The team was to comprise the Secretary of Trans-
portation, the NTSB, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the American Red Cross, air carriers, airline
employee representatives, and family representatives chosen
from families involved in aircraft accidents. 63 The purpose of
the task force was to transmit a report to Congress within one
year. The report was to contain several recommendations amal-
gamated into a model plan. 64 Section 704 required that the
report contain air-carrier guidelines for accident response.165
The statute also requested that the task force analyze the cur-
rent notification timeline and submit suggestions for a more
timely system, as well as offer suggestions for the steps needed to
present an accurate passenger list within one hour of the acci-
dent, 166 the possible additional costs of such speedy reporting,
67
and the personal privacy implications of such fast notification. 1'6 8
The task force also was to offer recommendations concerning
the protection of families from privacy intrusions by attorneys
and the media, 69 proper assistance to foreign families of in-
volved passengers, 17 approval of out-of-state mental health
workers in assisting the support team, 7 ' and use of military per-
sonnel and facilities to identify remains. 72
The task force report contained sixty-one recommendations,
which were almost all unanimously approved.1 7 Each recom-
mendation was written to serve as a "blueprint for the proper
treatment of families." Some of the more controversial recom-
mendations dealt with the use of DNA to identify victims' bod-
ies, the availability of cockpit voice recorders, and the return of
victims' personal possessions. 74 The task force document will
be discussed in more detail in Section VI of this article.
162 See Aviation Distaster Act, supra note 1, § 704.
163 Id. § 704(a).
- Id. § 704(c).
165 Id. § 704(b)(1).
166 Id. § 704(b) (6) (A).
167 Aviation Disaster Act, supra note 1, § 704(b) (6) (B).
168 Id. § 704(b) (6) (D).
169 Id. § 704(b) (2).
170 Id. § 704(b) (3).
171 Id. § 704(b) (4).
172 Aviation Disaster Act, supra note 1, § 704(b) (5).
173 Meeting the Airport Security Challenge: Report of the Secretary's Rapid Response
Team on Airport Security, Department of Transportation, at http://www.dot.gov/
affairs/airportsec.htm (Oct. 1, 2001).
174 Id.
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Since 1996, no additional changes to the ADFAA occurred un-
til the year 2000. Public Law 106-259, the Wendell H. Ford Avi-
ation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, was
approved in August 2000.175 "Air 21," as it is commonly called,
amends and reauthorizes a vast array of aviation legislation in
Title 49.176 For instance, Air 21 changes the dollar figures for
airport and airway improvement appropriations.17 7 The Air 21
legislation also creates changes within the Death on the High
Seas Act.l7 While these amendments modify these statutory sys-
tems, the modifications to the ADFAA are noteworthy but not
earth shattering.
First, Air 21 broadened the Act's reach to include not just do-
mestic carrier accidents, but also aviation accidents involving
foreign air carriers that take place within the United States. 179
Another broadening amendment extended the prohibition
against unsolicited communications. The new provision not
only prohibits unrequested contact from attorneys for possible
personal injury or wrongful death actions but also bars contact
by "any associate, agent, employee, or other representative of
the attorney."""' Furthermore, the 2000 statute forbids unsolic-
ited communication until the forty-fifth day after the accident,
thus adding fifteen days to the original waiting period. 1 '
The 2000 changes add language that includes air-carrier em-
ployees in the definition of passenger. 8 2 This seemingly small
addition is nevertheless important, for the new facet of who
qualifies as a passenger means that employees' families, as well
as persons aboard the flight who neither paid, held a reserva-
tion, nor occupied an actual seat will be considered as "passen-
gers."' I 3 Thus, the NTSB family services director and the
appointed support organization (Red Cross) must include and
provide support services to the families of employees, non-pay-
ing patrons, "stow-aways," and stand-by passengers. This does
place a greater burden on the air carrier to verify and communi-
cate to the families of the actual persons aboard the flight.
175 Wendell H. Ford Act, supra note 9.
176 See id.
177 Id. §§ 101-03.
178 See id.
179 Id.
's Wendell H. Ford Act, supra note 9, § 101-03.
181 i.
"2 49 U.S.C. § 1136(h) (2).
183 Id. § 1136(h)(2)(A)-(B).
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These amendments also added required content to the air-
carrier disaster plans. The plan now must provide an assurance
that the airline will let a family know, upon request, whether
their loved one was listed on the flight's preliminary passenger
manifest.18 4 One significant change places a higher duty on the
air carriers to provide disaster training to their employees.185
The new statutory language mandates that the training be "ade-
quate . . . to meet the needs of survivors and family members
following an accident."'" 6 On top of this new responsibility, the
2000 ADFAA requires an assurance from air carriers that they
will volunteer personnel to assist U.S. citizens in the event of an
accident outside the United States if the accident involves a "ma-
jor loss of life.' 87 The families must be within the United States,
and the air carrier must first consult the NTSB and the Depart-
ment of State in providing the assistance.' 8
B. AMENDMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 11, 2001.
Following the September 11th attacks, Congress enacted the
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.'8 The
purpose of the Act is "to preserve the continued viability of the
United States Air Transportation System." The Act supplies
structure and relief by compensating air carriers for losses in-
curred as a result of the terrorist attacks,' establishing the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board to review and decide on ap-
plications for federal aid, 91 setting a maximum total amount of
compensation available for an air carrier and its highly paid em-
ployees, 19 2 authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to en-
sure that communities receive adequate or essential air
transportation service, 193 providing reimbursement to air carri-
ers for increased insurance costs, 194 limiting air carrier liability
for the September 11 th terrorist acts and any occurring in the
180-day period following September 22, 2001,'9' providing com-
184 49 U.S.C. § 41113(b)(14).
185 See id. § 41113(b)(15).
186 Id.
187 Id. § 41113(b)(16).
188 Id.
189 See System Stabilization Act, supra note 2.
190 Id. § 101.
191 Id. § 102.
192 Id. § 103.
193 Id. § 104.
194 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2, § 201.
195 Id. §§ 201, 408.
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pensation to any individual, or relatives of a deceased individual,
who was physically injured or killed as a result of the September
11 th attacks,' 96 granting the United States a right of subrogation
for any claim paid under the Act,197 and authorizing President
George W. Bush's $3 billion spending commitment for airline
safety and security to "restore public confidence in the airline
industry."' g The Act also contains a "Congressional Commit-
ment" whereby Congress states that it "is committed to act expe-
ditiously . . . to strengthen airport security and take further
measures to enhance the security of air travel."' 99
Concerning federal subsidization of the aviation industry, the
Act mandates that the President compensate air carriers for di-
rect losses incurred as a result of any Federal ground-stoppage
order issued by the Secretary of Transportation following the
September 11th terrorist attacks, as well as any incremental
losses incurred between September 11 and December 31, 2001
as a "direct result of such attacks. ' 20 0 The air carrier may not
receive compensation in excess of the amount demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the President through "sworn financial state-
ments or other appropriate data." Such information may be au-
dited by the Secretary of Transportation and the Comptroller
General of the United States, who can also request additional
documentation.20 ' Compensation, paid in one or more pay-
ments, may not exceed the lesser of the Section 102(a)(2)
amount or a formula-determined amount if the air carrier runs
passenger-only, cargo-only, or combined passenger and cargo
flights. 2°2 In addition, the carrier must enter into a "legally
binding agreement" that it will not use the subsidy to pay an
officer or employee who made over $300,000 in 2000 compensa-
tion in excess of the 2000 amount.20 3 The air carrier cannot use
bonuses, stock, or other financial benefits to circumvent this
limitation.20 4
Concerning the limit on air carrier liability, the Act transfers
liability for any third party losses in excess of $100 million aggre-
I96f Id. § 403.
'97 Id. § 408.
1cs Id. § 501.
194 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2, § 502.
200 Id. § 101 (a) (2) (A)-(B).
201 Id. § 103(a).
202 Id. § 103(b).
2013 Id. § 104(a).
204 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2, § 104(b).
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gate to the Government once the Secretary of Transportation
certifies that the air carrier was a victim of an act of terrorism.2 °5
Moreover, the Act denies punitive damages if the disaster is cer-
tified as an act of terrorism.2 °6 Secondly, the Act sets up a waiver
system, whereby any claimant must waive the right to file a civil
action in any court, or continue prosecution of any civil action,
for damages sustained as a result of September 11 th terrorism if
the claimant accepts payment under the Act.20 7 Even though
the Act exacts a waiver for payment eligibility, it also reserves
rights for claimants under the Act. Any claimant under review
for payment reserves: (1) the right to be represented by an attor-
ney; (2) the right to present evidence, including the presenta-
tion of witnesses and documents; and (3) any other due process
rights determined appropriate by the Special Master.20 8
To receive payment under the Act, claimants must qualify as
an "eligible individual '2 9 who submits a single claim and waives
or withdraws from civil litigation. An "eligible individual" is one
who was present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or the
crash site at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, "at the time, or in the
immediate aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
September 11, 2001" and "suffered physical harm or death as a
result of such an air crash. ' 2"' Eligible individuals are also those
passengers and flight crewmembers on American Airlines flight
11 or 77 or United Airlines flight 93 or 175 (exclusive of partici-
pants and conspirators in the terrorism) or the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent.21  The eligible individual's claim
must be on the authorized form 21 2 and state the physical harm
suffered or, in the case of a decedent's representative, the possi-
ble economic and noneconomic losses suffered, as well as infor-
mation regarding collateral sources of compensation
received.21 3 Any claim must be filed within two years of 90 days
after September 22, 2001.214
205 Id. § 201 (b) (2).
206 Id. § 201 (b) (2).
207 Id. § 405(c)(3)(B).
208 Id. § 405(b) (4).
209 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2, § 405(c).
210 Id. § 405(b) (4).
211 Id. § 405(c) (2).
212 Id. § 405(2). The Special Master shall develop a claim form and ensure
that it can be filed electronically.
213 Id. § 405(a) (2).
214 System Stabilization Act, supra note 2, §§ 405(a) (3), 407.
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If the ATSSSA is successful in achieving its goals, Congress
may act to amend the ADFAA/FACFSA and engraft successful
provisions to provide more effective relief in future aviation
disasters.
VI. POSSIBLE FUTURE AMENDMENTS
The Task Force on Assistance to Families in Aviation Disasters
supplies one source of potential amendments to the Aviation
Disaster Family Assistance Act.215 The 1996 version of the AD-
FAA established the Task Force and gave the Secretary of Trans-
portation the authority to name representatives to the force.216
The statute mandated that the Secretary of Transportation co-
operate with other federal agencies, as well as air carriers and
families affected by previous aviation accidents. v So, airlines'
representatives, victims groups' designees, the NTSB, the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency, and the American Red
Cross nominated participants. The result was a twenty-seven-
member panel consisting of top-ranking officials from several
federal agencies (NTSB, DOT, Department of Health and
Human Services, American Red Cross, Department of State,
FEMA, Department of Defense), general counsel for the various
federal agencies, aviation attorneys, representatives of trade/ser-
vice organizations (National Air Disaster Alliance and Founda-
tion, Regional Airline Association, Families of TWA Flight 800
Association, Air Transport Association of America, Air Line Pi-
lots Association, Association of Flight Attendants), and various
victims of aviation disasters. 218
Doug Smith represented the National Air Disaster Alliance
and the families of American Eagle 4184 crash victims. He was
215 The Task Force was brought together by the Secretary of Transportation
and Vice President Al Gore, who chaired the White House Commission on Avia-
tion Safety and Security. Both a list of the Task Force members and the Task
Force's report can be found on the Department of Transportation's website. See
U.S. Dep't of Transp., Assistance to Families of Aviation Disasters, at http://www.
dot.gov/affairs/taskforce [hereinafter Task Force].
21 49 U.S.C. §§ 1136, 41113.
217 Id.
218 See U.S. Dep't of Transp., Report from the Task Force on Assistance to Fam-
ilies of Aviation Disasters, Appendix B (1997), at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
.htm [hereinafter Task Force Report]. The DOT's website is an excellent tracking
device. The Task Force continues to exist, meet, make recommendations, and
report on the status of its recommendations. Currently, the Task Force is devel-
oping plans for responding to aviation disasters involving civilians on govern-
ment aircraft. One problematic issue concerning government crashes is to which
sources the government will look to provide compensation to the families.
220
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named by Rodney Slater, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, to
serve on the task force. Smith saw the ADFAA's goal as "creating
change for the future in how we as a nation and industry come
together in the unfortunate tragedies to make the path of other
families as free of unnecessary burdens as possible. 2 1 9 Similarly,
the Task Force's motto reads, "Working Together-We Can
Make Things Better. 220
The ADFAA assigned to the force the task of developing rec-
ommendations and guidelines for the air carriers and their des-
ignated care assistance teams. The Task Force submitted its
report, model plan, and recommendations to Congress one year
after the enactment of the 1996 Act.22' The Task Force's prod-
uct consisted of sixty-one recommendations, which were almost
all agreed upon unanimously, cover a broad range of issues such
as notification of families, the process of accident investigation,
the treatment of affected families, the role of federal agencies,
and the release of information.2 22 While the report reaches a
broad range of issues, the specifics are confined to the statute's
compulsory focus-the treatment of families.22 "
Several themes underscore the Task Force's report. First, the
goal of timely and sensitive notification is a vexing problem.
Second, some governmental action is required through legisla-
tion and/or regulations, but most of the Force's suggestions can
be achieved without government action. Third, an airline has
the freedom to provide its own post-disaster support services,
but the Task Force suggests asking an independent third-party
to interact with the family members. 24
The report has fifteen sections with two main concentra-
tions-families' needs immediately following the disaster and
the role of assisting parties interacting with the families. 22' Not-
ing the suggestive but not mandatory thrust of recommenda-
tions, the Task Force posits stronger language in several places
by using "Congress should amend ... review ... examine" lan-
219 News Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Transportation Establishes Task Force
to Assist Families in Aviation Disasters, (Mar. 5, 1997), available at 1997 WL 92308
(D.O.T.).
220 Task Force Report, supra note 218, at Introduction. This website also pub-
lishes the Task Force's reports, such as the anniversary report. See Task Force,
supra note 215.
221 See 49 U.S.C. § 1136.
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guage.226 These statements require close attention for legisla-
tion and policy watchers, for one of the Task Force's stronger
suggestions has already been grafted into the ADFAA. The re-
port recommended that Congress amend the ADFAA and in-
crease the attorney-solicitation prohibition from thirty to forty-
five days.2 2 1 Congress heeded the advice and increased the wait-
ing period in 2000 to the recommended forty-five days. 228
A. POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS CONCERNING ATTORNEYS
Attorneys, especially the aviation bar, should carefully moni-
tor this issue for the Task Force also recommends that Congress
enact protective legislation to deter wrongful solicitation. As a
corollary, the recommendation suggests that the Department of
Justice fully prosecute wrongful solicitors.229 Even further, the
Task Force suggests adding a provision to the ADFAA allowing
families to revoke legal representation and settlement contracts.
As to future legislation, the report asks Congress to determine
whether victims' post-disaster statements can be admitted in fed-
eral courts by opposing parties' attorneys and whether contin-
gency-fee arrangements encourage misconduct and frivolous
lawsuits.230
B. POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS CONCERNING CASH OFFERINGS
Another hot issue centers on money, specifically cash com-
pensation given to families by air carriers. Following the Singa-
pore Airlines crash in Taiwan, the airline paid $25,000 to
families of passengers who were killed, $5,000 to injured passen-
gers, and then an additional $400,000 to the victims' families.23'
This cash offering is surprising because the treaty covering inter-
national air travel, the Warsaw Convention, limits the airline's
per passenger liability to $75,000.232 The $75,000 ceiling is
22 See, e.g., id. §§ 1.4.1, 7.2, 7.3.
227 Task Force Report, supra note 218, § 7.2.
228 Wendell H. Ford Act, supra note 9, § 401 (a)(1).
229' Task Force Report, supra note 218, §§ 7.2.2.1, 7.2.2.2.
230 Id. §§ 7.5, 7.6.
231 William Foreman, Singapore Air Kin Offered $400,000, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 4,
2000 (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
232 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 40105 (1994). According to the DOT Task Force, reports that the European
Union Council proposed a requirement that its member airlines compensate
families within fifteen days after passenger identification and not be less than
$ 20,500. (This calculation is 15,000 European Currency Units [ecu], Special
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lifted, however, if the air carrier engaged in willful misconduct.
Several factors could motivate such large cash gifts: an admis-
sion of guilt, an attempt to limit potential litigation liability, a
goodwill offering, and/or monitory assistance for affected
families.
Similarly, U.S. domestic carriers have offered financial assis-
tance. After the Alaska Airlines crash off the coast of California,
the airline did offer cash to relatives, but the payments were for
hotel rooms, food, and flights. 233 In 1999, after the June Ameri-
can Airlines accident at Little Rock National Airport, American
gave $25,000 to both survivors and family members of killed pas-
sengers. In an official company letter, American classified the
money as assistance to cover any expenses associated with the
incident. 234 And, most notably, following the September 11th
terrorist attacks, United Airlines advanced $25,000 to the fami-
lies of victims aboard Flights 93 and 175,235 and American Air-
lines offered "AA Helps" fares, special fares ranging in price
from $75 to $150 each way, to transport families of victims, Red
Cross employees, clergy, police, and firemen traveling to assist
in New York City.236
C. POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS CONCERNING ASSISTANCE TEAMS
The ADFAA prohibits any State or political subdivision from
preventing the assistance organization's agents from offering
counseling services.23 7 The Task Force suggests uniform licens-
ing waivers for out-of-state mental health workers to "practice"
in the State where the aviation disaster occurred.238 Interest-
ingly, this poses a federalism question for Congress because
Drawing Rights, times the dollar equivalency - 1 SDR = 1.3664 U.S. dollars. The
precise dollar equivalency is $ 20,496). U.S. Dep't of Transp., Implementation of
Task Force Recommendations sec. 1.3 (1998), at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/
taskforce/annivreport [hereinafter Anniversary Report].
233 Stacy Burns, Tragedy of Flight 261: Airline Focuses on the Grieving, MORNING
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Feb. 2, 2000, at A7, available at 2000 WL 5325744.
234 d. The DOT Task Force, in its anniversary report,\characterizes these cash
offerings as necessary financial assistance. See Anniversary Report, supra note 232,
§ 1.3.
235 Press Release, United Airlines, Untied Airlines Confirms Initial Payments to
Victims of Tragedies Involving United Flights 93 and 175, available at
www.ual.com.
236 Press Release, American Airlines, American Airlines Offers Special Fares to
Families of NYC Victims, Sept. 22, 2001, available at http://biz.yahoo.com/
prnews/010922/hssa008_l.html.
237 49 U.S.C. § 1 13 6 (g)( 3 ).
23 Task Force Report, supra note 218, § 6.2.
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mental health workers' licensing procedures are reserved to the
States under the Tenth Amendment. 23 9 Considering the Su-
preme Court's recent shift concerning the scope of the Com-
merce Clause in United States v. Lopez240 and United States v.
Morrison,241 it is doubtful that a federally enacted uniform licens-
ing waiver companion statute to the ADFAA be sustained under
Congress' power to regulate commerce; however, the shift in na-
tional ideology following the September 11th attacks may in-
crease the possibility of a waiver statute.
D. POSSIBLE AIR CARRIER OPERATIONAL CHANGES
In 1997, the Department of Transportation took action
through an "Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" or
ANPRM.242 The action was issued pursuant to the ADFAA and
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.24
The ANPRM requested that each U.S. air carrier research and
report on both the operational and cost concerns related to col-
lecting domestic air-transportation passenger-manifest informa-
tion. The DOT will use the information in considering possible
regulatory action to speed up the notification of families of vic-
tims in domestic aviation disasters. Currently, certified opera-
tors collect only passenger names for each scheduled flight and
are not required to collect any contact information.244
Following the submission of the air carriers' response, the
DOT may initiate regulations requiring more complete informa-
tion gathering. Possible changes may include requiring passen-
gers to give a full name, the name of an emergency contact, the
phone number of an emergency contact, proof of identifica-
tion.245 While these auxiliary morsels of information seem
small, the DOT estimated that the cost to obtain them could be
anywhere between $75.5 and $158.2 million. The costs would
be borne by air carriers, travel agents, and passengers (for the
value of lost time in providing the extra information) .246 Plus,
the DOT estimated that it might be necessary to compile 10.8
239) U.S. CONST. amend. X.
24o 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
241 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
242 Domestic Passenger Manifest Information, 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (pro-
posed Mar. 13, 1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 243).
243 Id.
244 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.693(e) (2000).
245 62 Fed. Reg. 11,789-97 (Mar. 13, 1997).
246 Id.
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million manifests annually.2 47 The DOT also requested esti-
mates of how e-ticketing procedures would increase or decrease
time and costs. 24 s
VII. THE RED CROSS
The American Red Cross is the named nonprofit organization
responsible for meeting needs of victims and families following
disasters. While the Red Cross gets involved after natural disas-
ters, it also enters the fray after major transportation disasters,
and specifically aviation disasters. Federally charted corpora-
tions, such as the Red Cross, are congressionally created to take
care of governmental functions. While these organizations take
care of social services mandated by the U.S. government, Con-
gress rarely grants these nonprofits with full-shield sovereign
immunity.249
Without sovereign immunity, these federally chartered corpo-
rations are vulnerable to lawsuits filed by private citizens, espe-
cially after the Supreme Court held that the American Red
Cross could be sued in federal court.2 ° The Court interpreted
the American Red Cross's charter as containing an implied
grant of federal jurisdiction through federal question jurisdic-
tion.25 Both federal appellate and district courts have allowed a
private litigant to bring a negligence action against the Red
Cross.25 2 While most of the cases where the Red Cross is the
named defendant involve blood transfusions, the ADFAA ex-
poses a new soft spot for the Red Cross. If the Red Cross can be
sued for providing tainted blood to disaster victims, they could
also be sued for providing negligent support services to victims
of aviation disasters.
No cases yet report this type of civil claim, but the ADFAA is
relatively new and untested in the civil court system. While it
might seem improbable for a disaster victim or family member
to sue the government or the Red Cross for negligence in pro-
viding support services, the subjective nature of the ADFAA's
247 Id.
248 Id. at 11,795.
249 There are other federally chartered corporations without sovereign immu-
nity, such as National Banks chartered by the government and American Indian
Organizations.
250 Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 274 (1992).
251 Id.
252 See e.g., Marcella v. Brandywine Hosp., 47 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. 1995); Rozak v.
Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 945 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
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provisions and the ideology involved in assessing what is effec-
tive "support" create potential potholes for support providers.
The ADFAA gives the NTSB primary responsibility for identi-
fying fatally injured passengers, z53 yet the ADFAA grants the in-
dependent organization (i.e., the Red Cross) with other serious
statutory duties: providing therapy, setting up a quiet, private
environment in which to grieve, arranging memorial services,
and communicating information in an efficient and compas-
sionate way. 25 4 The ADFAA does not specify what level of mis-
conduct creates a claim, but a plaintiff could base a civil action
on the ADFAA, the companion regulations, and other aviation
statutes to create a new cause of action. Thus, a potential plain-
tiff could "find" an implied right 25 5 to such measures as effective
counseling, privacy, timely receipt of information, approved me-
morial service, and quite possibly to "heal" from the tragedy.
Many of these possible claims will be reigned in by limits on suits
against mental health professionals, 256 yet a plaintiff may be able
to establish liability if non-licensed, volunteer, or untrained
counselors are used in the post-disaster support.
In the last two years, the Red Cross has been working on a
Statement of Understanding with chaplain organizations. 25 17
The Red Cross's objective is to increase successful coordination
efforts following aviation accidents. Because chaplains would fo-
cus on spiritual needs and guidance, as well as issues of religion,
spirituality, and the afterlife, the Red Cross is in a better position
than the federal government to coordinate personnel. Thus, in
the future, the ADFAA might have a spiritual needs component
as well as a focus on physical needs and offering comfort. This
partnership with the Association of Professional Chaplains illus-
trates the Red Cross's efforts to react to aviation tragedies in a
quick, caring, compassionate, respectful and spiritual manner.
One potential problem might arise under the FACFSA, for an
2-13 49 U.S.C. § 1136(b) .
254 Id. § 1136(c).
255 See C.O. Miller, Battles in the War to Prevent Aviation Accidents, 12 Am & SPACE
LAw 1, 18 (1998).
256 See e.g., Dolihite v. Maughon By & Through Videon, 74 F.3d 1027 (1 1th Cir.
1996) (Psychiatrists and psychologist did not follow accepted standards, but did
not depart egregiously from reasonable professional standards. The court held
that the district court should have granted the defendants' summary judgment.);
Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996) (Erroneous judgment is different
than deliberate mistreatment and deliberate indifference may only be inferred
when the departure from accepted standards is substantial.).
257 See http://www.itsasafety.org/Family/speeches/chaplain.
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American chaplains' group will be more focused on a western-
ized system of religion and may have difficulty responding to the
spiritual needs of passengers and families from different relig-
ious traditions.
VIII. MEDICAL EXAMINERS
The ADFAA also impacts medical examiners.2 58 Because the
ADFAA gives the NTSB primary responsibility for aiding families
following the accident, the NTSB must also coordinate all the
effective organizations and resources.25 9  For example, the
NTSB has to mobilize and direct the aviation-related federal
agencies, the state and local authorities at the accident's loca-
tion, as well as its own personnel and experts.
The NTSB is also responsible for making sure that all of the
accident victims are positively identified. Thus, the NTSB must
rely on the local medical examiner ("ME"), as well as quickly
coordinate resources, standards, and communications. The lo-
cal ME reciprocally relies on the NTSB to take over the coordi-
nation efforts, so the ME can focus on accident scene
investigation.260
As the party responsible for identifying bodies, the ME can
rely on several federal counterparts to aid the scientific work.
First, the ME can utilize the FBI's Disaster Squad for identifica-
tion through fingerprints. Second, the National Disaster Mortu-
ary Team can send experienced assistants to help identify
victims. Third, the ME may be able to utilize DNA testing sup-
ported by the Department of Defense. Finally, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services could lend its mo-
bile morgue.
Now that the NTSB, FBI, and related agencies face the gar-
gantuan task of identifying the thousands of people slain in the
September l1th attacks, the MEs and the NTSB should look to
develop regulations to guide post-disaster identification in expe-
ditious and efficient ways. For example, the agencies need to
consider issues such as: collecting antemortem information, get-
ting antemortem instructions from families, handling ambigu-
258 See Gary Abe, The Impact of the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of 1996 on





JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ous identifications, handling disbursal of personal effects, and
dealing with unidentified remains.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress rarely attempts to legislate compassion, yet the AD-
FAA and the FACFSA attempt to motivate the aviation industry
to "lend a helping hand" and provide "a shoulder to cry on."
These Acts, a rare instance of the government's involvement in
citizens' emotional care, endeavor to make the chaotic and
painful aftermath of a crash more humane. As described by a
newspaper reporter, "[flor those left behind, the death of a
loved one in an airline crash is a free fall into a living hell."'261
The ADFAA and the FACFSA console where tragedy has dealt
cruel shock.
While some view this legislation as a social welfare measure,
others, such as attorney Frank Carven, point out the business
necessity, "It's not only compassion . . .Whoever is running
these airlines understands the bottom line. An accident can put
you out of business overnight. Or you can take a bad situation
and treat people fairly and that will only add to those who use
your service. 12 2
It remains to be seen if there are latent flaws in these acts.
While some passengers and victims' family members have begun
to speak out about their concerns, no one as of yet has litigated
under these federal statutes. The potential remains, however,
for a victimized party to allege conflicts -of interest, settlement
coercion, negligently trained care teams, and federalism issues.
Moreover, the forty-five-day solicitation ban might not deter ea-
ger attorneys. Moreover, the statute is unclear as to whether the
ADFAA applies to crashes outside the territorial land or waters
of the United States. This creates a dangerous loophole for ag-
gressive plaintiffs' attorneys. Neither the ADFAA nor the
FACFSA provides a private cause of action, so it also remains to
be seen if lawyers will be sued for statutory violations and/or
legal malpractice.
Despite these potential pitfalls, the ADFAA did reach the goal
set forth by the victims' family groups-"to make things bet-
2131 Crash Victims' Families Question Using Airline Employees as Caregivers, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000, at 15A, available at 2000 WL 30815613.
262 Alonso-Zaldivar, supra, note 17.
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ter."263 Enabling the victims and their families to confirm the
terrible news, collect a loved one's belongings, receive a free
flight to the crash site, take advantage of grief counseling, or
arrange a memorial service does soothe the shock, pain, anger,
and pain. In the aftermath of September l1th, it is clear that
neither the airline industry nor our government will ever be
completely immune to accidents and terrorism. We did not
avert disaster, but the ADFAA answered the attacks and pro-
vided the first line of support in the midst of turmoil.
263 Anniversary Report, supra note 232. This report contains a discussion of
which of the Task Force's recommendations have been implemented, as well as
the process and effect of the implementations. For example, the Task Force dis-
cusses several outcomes: (1) Carriers using a broad definition of "family mem-
ber;" (2) Carriers notifying families of individual identifications, rather than
waiting to complete the entire passenger manifest; (3) Carriers using the internet
and third parties to post and communicate current information; (4) Carriers im-
plementing and improving training for care teams - for example, Continental
Airlines trains several regimens: emergency volunteers, reservations personnel,
airline personnel, station managers, and communication vendors, Northwest Air-
lines trains "Assist Members," and American Airlines uses survivors and family
members to help train future personnel in sensitivity and preparedness; (5) Car-
riers brokering out for service providers to return personal effects; and (6) the
NTSBs continued work and research to better its disaster response.
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